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This report was sponsored by the Union of  Emphasis is initially on policy, and as the
African Railways, as part of a Sub-Saharan  process proceeds on broad understanding and
Africa Transport Project task aimed at defining  commitment to the process of change.
what is involved in restructuring railways so that
they behave more like market-driven enterprises.  *  A contract  plan,  which defines Lhe  roles and
responsibilities of the railway and its owner (the
Problems with railway management are gen-  government). The contract plan flows from Lhe
erally related to the policy and institutional  strategic plan, and should not be developed in
framnework  within which the railway operates-  isolation from relatcd policy and funding
the behavior of the "enterprise" itself - rather  objectives of the government and railway.
than  to access  to technology  or capital.
t  A management plan, an intemal plan that
The question addressed in this document is  clarifies the objectives of the senior railway
not whether the railway should be restructured,  executives and their roles and responsibilities in
but how.  relation to the executive director.  The targets of
the three plans should not be confused.  Operat-
The report recommends four types of action  ing targets, for example, should not appear in the
to be employed in the process of institutional  contract plan, inviting political interference in
re.orm:  management operations.
- A strategic plan, which defines the environ-  *  An enabling actions plan, which lists most
ment in which the railway will function and fo-  of the initiatives that must be taken in conjunc-
cuses on the crucial policy issues that will guide  tion with implementation of the first three plans.
or influence the railway's planning and actions.  The focus should be to ensure that the roles and
The objective:  to generate a thorough public  responsibilities  defined will actually be realized
discussion of the role the railway should play  in law or enforceable agreement.
and the costs and benefits of altemative choices.
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In recent years, nations at every  level  of economic development
have shared the costly experience of troubled railway systems.  A large
body  of analysis has documented  the  relevant evidence.  Governments
recognize that no miracle  cure  Is available  and many  are beginning  the
arduous  but  essential  process  of  achieving  serious  reform  and
restructurIng.
The facts of railway llfe  are that If  things  are already bad
they are  likely  to get much worse  unless something Is done
about them.  In  fact,  It  Is  often only  when It  Is  seen how much
worse  things  can get that management  and  ministers are moved
to act on their  railway  problems. Long-term planning  Is  ...  the
only  way  In  which the employment and other social  Implications
of the necessary  changes can  be handled In a  way  which Is
acceptable to users,  workers, taxpayers and governments.'
This  statement,  by  a  former  chlef  economist  at  British  Rall,
particularizes for railways the  truth of Professor  Parkinson's  Law  of
Delay In  bureaucratic organizations,  namely,  that delay Is  the deadliest
form of denial.
ThiS paper  Is  addressed  to those countries which are  facing the
challenge  of fundamental  "restructuring";  the transformation of a  troubled
state-owned rallw,y  Into  a stand-alone  enterprise operated on commercial
principles  (even though the  government may retain  ownership).  It  provides
a framework --  a set of broad actions --  for achieving  practical  reform.
It Is neither a precise road mao  to guaranteaed  Outcomes, nor a check
list  needing only the proper boxes to be marked off,  nor a rule book with
a  set  of  correct  answers.  Indeed restructuring railways and  their
governments  will  immediately  realize  that In  an Increasingly  competitive
world such P-ecision  and certainty do not exist. If  they are to succeed,
the  government  and rallway planners who  lead the  reform effort must
display the same qualities  of flexibility,  transparency  In the assembly
and  display  of  Information,  careful  assessment  of  the  risks  of
alternative  courses  of  action,  and  prompt  and  unambiguous  declaration  of
conclusions reached and actlons to be taken that the reformed railway
Is  going  to  have  to  show  If  It  Is  to  succeed  In  a  competitive  commercial
transport/logistics  environment.  Both  the  reform  decision-makers  and  the
reformed  railway must  be  Infused by the  same  spirit,  exchanging the
static "rules  and regulations"  code of bureaucracy for the open-minded
and dynamic Imperatives of competitive enterprise.  In essence, reform
must become a state of mind.
The paper suggests four general documents around which the reform
effort may be organized:
(1)  a  Strategic  Plan which  relates  the  restructured  railway
enteprise  to  the  broader  political,  social, and  economiccontext  within  which  It  will  function  and  addresses  major
public  policy  optlons.
(2)  a  Contract  Plan  which  defines  the  specific  commitments  and
obligations  flowing  from  the  Strategic  Plan  which  the
Government  and  the  railway  enterprise  formally  accept  as
their respective  responsibilities,
(3)  a  Management  Plan  for  the  railway  which  establishes  an
organizational  structure,  functional  responsibilities,  and
performance  measures  for  effective  Internal  management
control,  In  light  of  the  requirements  Imposed  by the decision
to  operate  as  a  commercial  enterprise,  and
(4)  an  *Enabilng Actlons"  Plan, as  needed,  to  lst  the  necessary
legislative,  legal,  and formal admInistrative  changes  necessary
to carry  out  the  planned  restructuring.
Many  develooed  and  developing  countries  have  had  at  least  some
experience  wlth documents  of this type, as  shown  In the box  below.  As
noted,  this  Is a  representative  but  not  an  all-inclusive  list because
more  countries  are  being added  and because  It Is not clear  exactly  tiow
to classify certain  Initiatives already  underway.
Experionce  tWith  Raoli  wav  Rostructuring  Initiatives:  BOX  1 ountries  Which  Havo  Instituted
Or  Are  D-veloping  Variour  Approaches
Latin  Europe,  Middle America`  East  ad North  Developed
(LAC)  AFRICA  Africa  (EMENA)  ASIA  Iountr  es
Strategic Plans  "Mxico  N  yae"  Hungary  Indio  Conrail  (US)
Uruguay  Nigeria  Pakistan  Jo  an
Tanzania  Bria  (Fran7t)
Deutsch*  Bundoesbhn
Contract Plans  Mexico  Cameroun  Tunisia  China  SNCF Uruguay  Kenif  Morocco  Kohrea
NMglri  Yugloslavia
Senegal
Management  Plans  Kenya  Korea  Britlh  Rail
Zaire,  Cooe  Brits  aI
Doutscho  Bundxob..
Enabling  Actions  Plans  India  Conrail
Japan
Note:  This  io  not  an all  inclusive  list.  In  some cases,  also,  documents  are  in  very  initial  stage*.During  the  discussion  below, the  boundaries  between  the  four
documents are drawn  somewhat more clearly than they actually  would be
In practice.  In many  cases,  some  functlons or  commitments  might
aopropriately  be shifted from one  locument to the other (i.e.,  from  the
strategic  plan  to  the  management  plan,  etc.).  Each  country  must  make  Its
own decisions In  this  respect --  what matters  Is  that each of the major
Issues be Identifled  and resolved.
The body of the paper below concerns Itself  primarily  with outputs-
-reoorts, contracts  and  plans--and not with the process whereby  the
conditions  for producing these outputs are achieved. The process issue
is sufficiently  particular to each country and each raliway to make an
exhaustive treatment beyond the scope of this paper.  A brlef,  overall
discussion of process may be useful,  however, In  Droviding  a context for
what  follows.
.INTRODUCT  ION
The  World  Bank's  reviews  of  railway  crlses 2 show  very  clearly  that
they  do  not  come  about  suddenly,  nor  do  they  happen  by  accident.
Although the points of  emphasis  may  differ,  this  conclusion  Is  Just  as
true of rallways In  the developed as In  the developing  world. As a broad
generalization,  railway  crises  occur  because  railways  have  not  been
encouraged,  or  allowed,  to respond  to changes  In the  economies  they
serve.  Long  after  major  segments  of  rallway  traffic  have  been  captured
by  competitors  which  are  often  privately  owned  and  operated, railways
continue  to  offer  services  which  are  not  In  demand,  at  prices  which  are
often  far  below  cost,  and  wlth  a  quality  of  service  which  Is  Inferior  to
the  customer's  needs.  Typically  also,  as  the  railway  becomes  a  fiscal
drain  on  an  economy  already  short  of  resources, longer  range maintenance
and  capital  needs  are  neglected,  further  diminishing  the  railway's
capabilities  as  the  years  pass.  The  longer  the  problem  continues,  the
more difficult  and expensive It  Is  to  resolve,  and  the  more  likely  It  Is
to be *put off until  next year".
Across  all  economies and cultures,  this situation Is  the result  of
some or all  of the following  forces:
(1)  Th.e  rallway Is  goneraly one of t-e nat,n.s oldet  In-atitu-
tions,  and Its  years of history have endowed It  with  perceived
roles--such  as  a  "public  service  obligation"--and  an
associated  engineering  and  production-oriented  management
culture  which  are  uniquely  resistant  to  change.
(2)  The  railway  often  has  the  largest  single  unionized  work  force
In the nation, giving Its  workers  a great  deal of political
power which Is used to protect the size of the labor force,
even when there Is little  productive work to be done.
(3)  Over  the  years,  various  classes  of  passengers  (typically
commuters and third  class Intercity  passengers) and shippers
(often  agricultural Interests  and  major  government-owned
mining  or Industrial  enterprises) have been able to persuade
the regulatory authorities  of the government  to distort the
rate structure In  their favor.  The stated rationale for the
Intervention In freight rates  Is as predictable  ("the  nation
needs to control freight  rates  In  order to promote exports,
or to control Inflation")  as the result:  nothing positive Is
achieved because  the resulting deficits are merily  shifted
from  one  agency  budget  to  the  other,  and  the  management
Incentives  of  both  railway  and  shipper  are  badly  distorted.
Regional  Interests  also believe  that  the  existence  of  rail
service  (but  not,  necessarily,  Its  use)  Is  Important  elther  to
maintain  the  local  economy,  or  to  protect  the  possibility  of
a  desired  future  development  program.  Eventually  the
beneficlaries  of  the  system  of  cross  subsidies  come  to  believe
Ithat their favored status Is  not only Important to them, but
Is  also Important  to the health  of the nation,  and they defend
their positions tenaciously.
(4)  The people at large  may  believe that a railway Is "needed",
whether or not It Is  economically  Justifiable,  either because
they  believe  that  rail service  Is a  baslc  "right" (like
education or health),  or because they consider the presence
of a railway to be one of the status symbols of nationhood.
(5)  The ministry which owns and operales  the raliway  may  be as
Interested In  protecting Its  organ -.. mtlonal  domain,  budget,  and
political  Influence  as It Is In  serving the needs of shippers
or  tackling  the  difficult  task  of  restructuring  the  railway.
(6)  Flnally,  many  of  the Important actual or potential  customers
eventually switch to other  modes  because  the  service  may
have  become  suffilciently  slow and unreliable that  It Is  no
longer economical to use  rail.  These  former  users  are  no
longer  advocates for change and Improvement. Of course, the
other beneficlaries  of poor rail  service,  the  -ompeting  (non-
rail)  transport modes, are often committed advocates  of the
status quo as well.
.n many  Instances,  the  only  agency  experiencing  Immedlate  pressures
for  change  Is  the  finance  ministry because ultimately It  pays  the  bills
out  of  the  public  treasury.  At  least  In  the  Initial  years of a developing
crisis,  the  result  of  this financial pressure  Is to  reduce  outlays
wherever  possible  which,  unfortunately,  typically  results  In  the  well
known  downward  spiral  of  deferred  maintenance  and  reduced  capital
budgets  (and  eventual  poor  service)  noted  above.  Exper!ence  indlcates,
however,  that  financial  pressures  alone,  even  when  they  reach  monumen-
tal proportions  (such as  the  US  $  10  billion  annual  losses  of  the
Japanese  National  Railways  before  Its  restructuring), are  rarely
sufficlent  to bring about  the  right  kind  of  change;  real  change  happens
when financial  pressure Is  combined  with a realization  by the government
and  railway customers  of the true burden  Imposed on  the  economy  by
poor, or unnecessary, rail  service and with acceptance  on the part of
railway  management  that  an  economically  rational  role  for  the  rallway  Is
the  best  guarantee  of  long  term  health  and  stability  for  the  railway.
When  this  polnt  Is  reached,  the  measures  discussed  later  In  this paper
become  feasible.
Therefore the real challenge of railway  restructuring Is  political,
not solely  financial  or technical.  Absent political  will,  there Is  no ready
combination  of  financial  aid,  technical  advice,  and  training  which  will
accomplish  much more than postponing  the Inevitable,  and  In  Increasing  Its
cost  when  It  arrives.  The  principles  of  promoting  change  are  well  known:
the  beneficlaries  need  to  be  Identif  led  and  organized,  and  those  sufferlng
harm need to be assisted.  Because of the very wide range of Interests
of the potential benei  larnes  and adversely affected parties,  the very
highest levels of Pol ical  leadership must  understand  and  support  a
program of change.  In  turn,  all  agencies of the government must, through
full and  open  discussion, understand  and  accept  the  Implications  of
reform, a  stage which will  only be reached  If the political  leadership
IIclearly  assigns responsibility  and authority for  the  management  of  change
to  an  appropriate  official  --  and  makes  It clear  that  results are
expected.  The  official  could be drawn  from political  circles, from a
ministry,  from the rallway,  or,  as has happened In  several developed and
developing  countries  (e.g.,  the  US,  the  United  Kingdom, France,  and
Uruguay),  could be an authoritative and  impartial  person  from ou".side
government  and  railway.  Because  the  problem  Is primarily rooted  In
social and  political considerations, the  criteria  for  selecting the
offlcial  should  be broad experience In  the operation of large  Institutions
and acceptability to all parties, not necessarily expertise In railway
operation or engineering.
The next step Is  to obtaln the support of major users (or  potential
users)  of  the  system  and  of  railway  management.  The  offer  to  the  user
Is  better  and  more  reliable  service  In  return,  In  some  cases,  for  higher
rates  or  longer  term  commitments  for  traffic.  As  discussed  later,  for
those  users  who cannot,  or  will  not,  pay  rates  that  cover  costs,  explicit
subsidles  from  public  authorities  may be  warranted  when such subsidies
can  be  justified  by  legitimate  pubilc  requirements.  The  proposal  to
railway  management  follows  accordingly:  although  some services  may be
reduced  or  eliminated  by the reform process,  those operations  which
remain  will  give the railway  a  stable  basis  for  future  survival  and
growth,  and management will  be given  much broader  authority  and  autonomy
to make decisions  with  a  minimum of  outside  Interference.
At  the  same time,  those  who  are  truly  Injured  by  the  restructuring
must  be  Identified  and  dealt  with.  In  some  cases,  the  damage  Is  so
limIted  or  vague  ("we need  rail  service,  even  though  we do  not  use  It,  .. n
order  to  keep  the  truck  sates  down"),  that  no  compensation  Is  due.  In
others,  such  as  the  user  who has made a legitimate  location  decision  and
related  Investments  In  the  belief  that  an  existing  rate structure  would
continue,  at least  some transitlonal  assistance,  elther  through  subsidy
or  phase-in  of  rate  changes,  may be needed.
Labor  will  often  be a major  Injured  9arty.  Much study  has  been,  and
continues  to be directed  at this Issue.  Although  much remains  to  be
learned,  and specific  approaches  will  always  need to be tailored  to the
conditions  of each  country,  two broad  conclusions  are emerging.  Flrst,
some  form  of  fair  compensation  and/or  assistance  In  finding  other
employment has been a  feature of all successful labor redundancy
programs. For example,  In  recent  loans  to the  Sudan and to  Zaire,  the
financing  of  compensation  (though  not  necessarily  by the  World  Bank)  has
been an explicit  part of the  overall  Initiative.  In  Uruguay,  a vigorous
program of assistance In  finding  other,  often better,  employment  for
redundant  employees  was a  keystone. The second  conclusion,  however,  Is
that the cost of not reducing  redundant labor,  whether Imposed  by
government  or by labor  union  pressure,  Is  often  underestimated  because
disgruntled  employees  can  extract  a  price  In  poor  morale,  Inefficient  and
undisciplined  operations,  and Inflexibility  of  service  which  appears  to  be
quite large,  even by comparison  with  the surplus  wage bill.  Railways,
because  of their  complexity  and the  critical  requirement  for  controlled
management,  are therefore  not good places  to absorb  surplus  labor:  In
Illthe  Uruguayan  reforms,  the  Government  actually concluded  that  the
rallway would be better  off If  the surplus workers were  paid to stay
home until  alternative arrangements could be made than If  they continued
to report to the railway. Taking  both the explicit  and Implicit  costs Into
account, the "rate  of return"  for successful labor  redundancy schemes Is
very  hlgh,  often  much  higher than  any  Item on  the  proposed  capital
Investment programs  on the  railway's  agenda.  An acceptable  plan for
addressing the Issue  of labor  force adjustment Is  therefore as Impc.rtan..
to the success of a  reform program as the related chanqes In  management
and  physical  plant.
For  many  reasons,  then,  railway  restructuring  Is  an  Inharently
messy  process  which  Is  deeply  political,  often  confrontational,  and
difficult  to  predict  or  control  in  advance.  Such programs  take patience
and  time,  often  measured  In  years.  This  does  not  me2n  that
reorganization  must  always  take  so  long;  but  clearly  the  process  should
not  be  approached  casually.  A  crlsis  which  develops  slowly,  as  the
result of  powerful  forces  at  work,  cannot  be  resolved  on  the  basis  of
Instant  deeisions. Time Invested  at the beginning  on planning,  on bringing
all  Interested parties Into the process, and on developing the required
degree of commitment to change Is  always time  well  spent.  The  Initiator
could be the raliway,  a government  agency, or entirely outside forces,
but sustainable progress will  not be made until  all  are working together.
If  the groundwork  Is properly done, the reform process can begin wlth
reasonable prospects  for success.
As a final  Introductory note, the following  discussion describes a
series of steps wMiCh could be carried out  in considerable detail.  In
many cases,  exhaustive  detall  may not  be necessary,  or even desirable,
certainly  at the  outset  of the  process. If  choices  must be  made, It  Is
far  preferable  to place  emphasis  on Identifying  the  major  policy  Issues
and  developing  solid  agreement  and  understanding  among  all  parties  on  the
necessary  changes  than It  Is  to develop  plans  or "contracts"  which  are
so complex and sophistIcated  that on!y the consultants  or experts
understand  their  contents.
lvPLAN  I
THE  STRATEGIC PLAN
The  Strategic  Plan (SP)  must  be  prepared  cooperatively  by  the
Government  and  the  railway  enterprise, 4 arid  ultimately  accepted at the
highest  levels  In  each.  The SP Is  the centerpiece of the restructuring
effort.  Its purpose  Is to  surface  for  explllt  examination all the
difficult  public  policy  questlons  which,  If  left  unattended,  can  scuttle
achievement  of  workable  reform.  Indeed,  one  of  the  reasons  why
restructuring  programs  have  often  produced  lnitlally  unsatisfactory
results  (the  case  of  Conrail  Is  an  excellent  example)  Is  that  they  were
developed  without  an  adequate  assessment  of  critical  strategic  Issues,
due either to lack  of Information,  neglect  or  to  the  unwiliingness  of  the
parties  to  face  up  to  them  (or  all  threel).
Strategic  planning  takes  many  forms.  For  Instance,  It  can  be  a
relatively  routine  exercls% In  a  corporation that has been preparlng such
plans for  many  years  and  .rgages  In  a  stable  line  of  business.  The  word
"plan"  Itself  suggests  a  degree  of nermanency.  In  this  paper, however,
we  are  discussing  strategic  planning  In  the  context  of  making  often
wre,nching  changes  In  the  status  quo  wNlch  affect  numerous sectors of the
public.  In  this  settina.  Strateoic  Plans  must  be  fluid.  dvnamic.  evolving
documents.  Rigidity  and  Inflexibility  will  result  In  paralysis  and  eventual
failure.
The  SP  Is  the  primary  document  for  stimulating  and  guiding  the
policy  dialogue  between  government,  railway,  and  oublic.  It  Identifies
major  goals  and  policy  options  so  that  the  best  and  most  realistic
choices  can  be  made,  and  made  openly,  laying  out  the  Implications  for  all
affected  parties  of  various  policy  choices  and  macroeconomic
assumptions,  recelving  feedback  about the acceptability  of the outcomes
foreseen,  and  revising  the  assumptions,  policles,  and  objectives
accordingly.
In  brief,  the  strategic  assessment  process  will  be  an  Interactive
one.  Certalnly,  at  the  outset,  several  draft  or  prellminary  plans  are
likely,  and  those  preparing  the  SP  should  expect  It  to  be  modified.  The
greater  the  transparency  of  this  process  and  the  greater  the  number
of  Interested  parties  actively  participating  In  It,  the  greater  Is  the
likelihood  of:  (a)  multiple  drafts,  and  (b)  a  workable  final  product.  The  SP
should  be  used  to  draw  the widest possl'-,i  participation  (in  part  to
develop  a  political  consensus  for  acceptance  of  difficult  public  choices),
Including  legislators,  other government :ncles,  regional  and  provincial
authorities, labor,  shippers, acadenmics,  financial  Institutions,  and the
traveling  public.  It  would  be  rare,  and  probably  Indlcative  of  unresolved
and  buried  Issues,  If  an  SP were  adopted  as  originally  presented.  Where
successful  reform  has  occurred,  It has  been  common  for  the  SP  to  be
recycled several times before stabilizing  around a generally acceptable
course of actlon. Accordingly,  sufficient  time,  resources, and patience
Imust be  made available  for the completion  of this task. As well,  the SP
becomes  the basis for development of a much more  effective Contract
Plan and Management  Plan.  The SP  Is the place candidly to raise and
resolve the toughest and  most challenging  questlons about the short term
and  long term future of the  rallway.  "in  the final  analysis the most
effective universal  approagh  to  decislonmaking Is to  ask  the  right
question at the right time."
Establish  the  Mission  and Obactives  of  the  Enterprise
In the  broadest  sense,  the  mission  of  the  restructured  and
revitalized  railway  will  be  to  provide  adequate  and  efficient  rail  service
of  goods  and  passongerr  by  roplleating  the  behavior  of  a  commerclal,
protit-oriented  railway  enterprise  vperating  under  conditions  of  adequate
competition.  This  means  that  the  railway's approach  to  providing
services  must  be  demand-driven,  customer-orlented,  market-determined,
results-led --  If the market  (or government) will  not pay  for a gIven
service,  It  will  not be offered by the rallwa-  This does not mean that
the railway  or any of Its  assets must neces,  "v be privatized;  however,
Incentives  and authority should  be created so t.;at  It  Is In  the railway's
Interest,  and within  Its  power, to carry out the mission defined for It.
The primary objective of the enterprise may  be framed In  various
ways,  depending  on  the  circumstances  and desires In  each country.  For
purposes of lI'ustratlon,  one plausible  definition  of the overall  goal for
the railway enterprise Is to recover from revenues  funds In  an amount
sufficient  to pay the costs of providing  the service,  meet  Interest and
prlncipal  payments  on Its  debt, and contribute to new Investment In  the
re!!"wn.  Cy,'-  - fUntr!eS  ba1y  ats+4  {or the rtH!way  s!m-!y  bree!ng  even
(though  the  meaning  of  "break-even"  must  be  carefully  explained);  others
may  wish  the  railway  to  earn  clear  profits  as  well,  In  effect  generating
dividends  for  Its  public  owners.  Ideally,  the  railway  will become
financiaily  self-sustaining.  In  many  Instances,  political  and  economic
realities  will  dictate that full  achievement of the profit  objective  be
phased  In over  a  period of time, as the  railway transitions from  Its
current situation to one In  which It  operates  routinely  as a commerclal
enterprise.  The  Important thing Is to define the objective and set a
challenging  but realistic  timetable for reaching It.
Since  many  restructurlng  railways  carry  heavy  debt  burdens
accumulated In  the past,  decisions  must often be made about re-financing.
In most  of these  cases, the  reformed  railway will  be unable to earn
enough from farebox and freight  charges to pay off old debt, no matter
how well It  Is  operated.  If  this  condition Is  not rectifled,  the basis for
effective entrepreneurial management  of the rallway  will  be undermined
from the beginning.  In  some fashion,  the Government  will  probably have
to assume many  of these obilgations  (of  course, In  some  Instances,  the
Government  may already hold the debt paper or guarantee  It)  as part of
a  process of providing  a revised capital  structure of the railway,  which
Is approprlate to the new scale and mode  of operatlons.  The Japanese
Government,  for example, established a  separate  Settlements Corpora-
2tion to absorb most of the debt of the Japanese National Railways (JNR)
at the time JNR was restructured.
Given  that  the  objective  Is  to  operate  the  railway  as  a
conmnerclaily  oriented enterprise, It Is possible that  governments  at
various  levels will still  want  the  raliway to offer  certain services
(including  intire lines)  wl.ich  cannot, or will  not be permitted,  to cover
costs.  In such Instarnes,  where  the raliway Is given the objective of
operating  certaln uneconomic  services  In behalf of  governments,  the
governments  must  commit to paying the full  cost of these  "supported"
services In  excess of permissible  revenue, assuming efficient  operation
by the raliway. Basically  the railway should serve as a  contractor  to
the Goverrment  In these  situations.  In the SP, the Government  must
clearly  specify  the uneconomic services (and  the related  financial  obliga-
tions)  which It Is  wlliing  to support.
Identify  Major  Market/Service  Sectors
Once  the  railway's  objective  has  been  defined,  the  Government  and
railway  should  Identify  the  market/service  sectors  which  are  to  be
continued, expanded, dropped, or Introduced.  The shape of this listing
Is likely  to change as the strategic assessment  process proceeds, but
a  representative Initial  set might well Include  the following:
(1)  Freight  - describe  major  commodities,  traffic  flows,  and
volumes,  and the services to be provided  (e.g.,  less  than wagon
load  (LWL),  wagon  load  (WL), block  train,  specialized  equipment,
intermodal).
(2)  Intercity  passenger  - describe  principal  market  flows  served
and  services  offered  (e.g.,  1st,  2nd,  and  3rd  class,  dining,
sleeper,  express,  local,  baggage).
(3)  Regional  and/or  suburban  commuter  - describe  services,
frequencies,  ridership,  specialized  facillties  required,  etc.
A  list  of services and markets that are considered prime  candidates
for  discontinuation  of  service  --  e.g.,  LY"L freight  service  and  passenger
service  on  remote  branch  lines  --  should  also  be  identif  led.  This  listing
Is  likely  to  change  In  size  and  composition  as  the  strategic  assessment
unfolds.  It  Is  also  probable,  especlally  at the outset of  the  strategic
planning  effort,  that the need for physlcal  shrinkage In  the size  of the
system will  be evident on many  railways.  Thus  entire  segments  of  rail
line  will  be  earmarked  as  candidates  for  abandonment.
Flnally,  the  SP  should  highiight  and  evaluate  the  potential  for
earning  addltlonal  Income  from  various  services  ancillary  to  operation  of
the raliway. Following  Is  a partial  llsting  of  such  possibilities.
*  Leasing or franchising  station space to Independently  owned
restaurants, other  commerclal shops, and government  postal
and  telecommunications  agencies,  as  well  as  other  forms  of
commerclal  development  of  railway-owned  real  estate.
*  Parcel  service  on  freight  or  passenger  trains.
3*  Repair  of  non-rail  equipment  In  railway  maintenance  facilities.
*  Manufacturing  products  for  sale  to  non-rail  customers  In
railway  manufacturing  facilities.
*  Value-added  logistics  services  for  shippers,  e.g.,  warehousing,
Inventory  control,  sub-assembly  and  packaging,  freight
forwarding, freight consolidation, and  Intermodal arrange-
ments.
*  Intermodal  services  In  collaboration  with truck,  bus, airline,
and water  carrier companies, and  shipper associations and
travel agencies.
Conversely,  the  Plan  should  consider  the  economic  wisdom  of  con-
tracting-out  certaln  railway activities such  as  rolilng stock  main-
tenance, parcel service,  terminal  operation,  and provision  of specialized
equipment (e.g.,  containers) to other  companies.  If  private commercial
Interests can provide these services at less  cost and similar  or better
quality  than the railway,  It  makes  sense  for the rallway  to divest them.
In  working toward the objective of obtaining  revenues sufficient  to
cover  costs, debt  service  and  retirement,  and  Investment  needs, the
railway  enterprise  must  be  relentless  In creating value from all Its
assets.  For  example, railways the world over  have  often  generated
substantial  earnings from the sale,  lease,  or development of surplus real
estate, especially  In  metropolitan areas.  The railway  must also evaluate
the potential  of actively  persuading new production facilities  and other
business operations to locate facilitles  on Its  real estate which could
generate  profitable  traffic  for  the  railway.  As  well,  operation  of
hotels,  bus  lines,  and  cartage  companies  may  be  sources  of  Income  (or,
depending on the circumstances,  sources of net  cash drain from which  the
railway should  withdraw).  The  Strategic  Plan  should  review  these
"markets"  and  the  railway's  relationship  to  them.
Pose the  Crucial  Policy  Options
Given  agreement  that  commercially-oriented  operation  of  the  railway
Is  the  objective,  and  with  the  desired  railway  services  tentatively
Identifled,  the  Strategic  Plan  must  next  Identify  those  aspects of the
national transport policy which apply to the railway,  and  lay out the
crucial  policy  Issues  which have to be resolved If  the  objective  Is  to be
met.  This  process  will  have  an  Impact on both the objective and the
services,  probably  re-shaping  both  to  some  extent,  but  lead  to  a  much
clearer and more  realistic  understanding of the duties and obligations
which each party --  Government  and railway  --  ultimately  must assume.
Each country will  have some policy  Issues  unique  to It,  but virtually
all  will  confront  the  following:
Cost Recove.-y  from  Users.  To operate on a commercial basis,  the
railway must charge  Its  customers  rates that cover  the operating and
capital  costs of the services they demand. The strategic planning  effort
must  Include  a  careful assessment  of the degree of cost recovery which
Is anticipated In total,  and  for each of the market/service  segments
4identif  led  previously.  If  there Is little  or no demand for a  service and
adequate  rates cannot be charged, the service should be dropped by the
railway.  On the  other  hand,  If  governments  (national,  provincial,  or  local)
are  prepared  to cover  the shortfall  between revenues  and the operat-
Ing  and capital  costs for a  service,  the railway should  willingly  provide
the service:  In  such situations  government would simply  become another
paying  customer.  In  brief,  tha  railway  should  be  Indifferent  to  the
sources  of  the  revenue  provided  that  costs are  recovered.  Both  railway
and Government  must accept the principle  of cost  recovery.  Without It
economically efficient operation  and  effective management  cannot  be
achieved.
It deserves  emphasis  that  the  question  Is not  whether  cost
recovery will  be achieved:  cost recovery, through some combination of
revenues, subsidies,  borrowings,  or capital  erosion Is  unavoldable. The
Important principle  Is  that the revenues and/or government  support for
each service should be equated with costs.  This Is the only way  that
rational  choices,  and plans,  can be made.
Pricing  Policies.  Many  approaches  to  pricing  exist  and they are
lIkely  to  differ  by  major  line  of  business.  The  SP  should  develop
agreement  on  the  pricing  principles  to  be  used  In  each  market  segments
e.g.,  fully  commercial,  "value  of  service"  (often  called  "Ramsey  )  pricing
for  freight  and  selected  Intercity  passenger  services,  "marginal  cost"
pricing  for  commuters  and  other  Intercity  passenger  services,  and  com-
petitively-based  profit  maximization  for  commercial  services  such  as
leasing  space  In  stations to private businesses.  It  Is  crucial  that  the
railw-y be gIveni  substintial freedom to negotiate contract  rates with
Its freight customers,  and to raise and  lower rates  In response  to
competition, In market/service  segments  that  the Government  will not
directly  subsidize.  This freedom may be subject to regulatory protection
against the extremes  of below cost predatory  pricing  (I.e  rates below
marginal  cost)  and  the  undue  exercise  of  pure  monopoly  power  vis-a-vls
captive  users  of  the  service  (i.e.  rates  which  are  sufficlently  far  above
marginal  cost  so  that  an  Individual  customer  or  class  of  customers  Is
being  asked  to  make  an  undue  contributlon  to  the  coverage  of  fixed
costs).  Quite  simply,  where  competition  exists,  railways  must be free to
compete.  The economic logic  of "full  cost recovery" plus "pricing  flexibi-
lity"  will  undoubtedly result In  the conclusion  In  the Strategic Plan that
some rail  services should  not survive,  or should  not survive In  all  loca-
tions.  Where  government  authorities choose  to support an otherwise
uneconomic  railway  service,  they  will  be  responsible  for  pricing  the
service.  The  Strategic  Plan  should  contain  a  clear  definitlon  of  the
pricing  policies  that  the Government  will  apply to the non-commercial
services that It  authorizes.
The question of monopoly pricing  Is  an Issue  which,  while  It  can not
be resolved  In this paper, requires discussion.  The  railway Is quite
likely  to carry certain nationally  Important  commodities under conditlons
which do  not permit adequate  competition.  If so, there  Is legitimate
concern  that  the  railway  be  prevented  from  "abusing"  Its  monopoly
positlon  --  and  this  concern  usually  manifests  Itself  In  a  desire  for
5various degrees of government  Intervention In  rate setting.  There are
two  countervailing  considerations:  first, government  Intervention
undermines the essential objective that the railway be free to pursue
Its  commercial Interests,  and be accountable for doing so;  and, second,
that  the  government,  as  the  owner  of  the  railway, Is the  direct
benefcilary  of Improved fInancial  performance  by  the  railway,  so long  as
the  rallway does  not set  Its rates  so high as to unduly restrict the
flow  of the commodity  In  question.
There  Is  no  easy  solution  to  this  challenge.  One approach  would  be,
as  has  been  the  case  In  the  US  and  Canada,  to  restrict  rate  regulatory
Intervention  to  only  those  cases  In  which  there  Is  no  effective
competition,  the  railway  Is  clearly  charging  rates  far  above  Its  variable
costs, and the proposed  rates  slgnificantly  restrict traffic  movement.
Under  these  cases,  some  upper  limitation  could be  placed  on  rates.
Alternatively,  the traffic could be declared "social"  traffic  (much like
suburban passenger traffic,  for example)  where the railway  could become
In effect a contractor  to the government  and would  haul the  traffic
under contracted terms and conditions. These,  or other,  solutions  should
be Identifled  and discussed In  the course of the preparation of the Sr.
Social  Service Commitments.  Railways all  over the world have been
used,  explicitly or  Impilcitly,  as  Instruments  of  social  policy.
Integrating  the  country,  opening  up  remote  areas  to  settlement,
encouraging  economic  development  or  foreign  Investment,  Income
redistributio3n  and political  pacification  through low  (or  no)  fares  for  rail
passengers,  and various labor-related  objectives (discussed  below),  are
a few among many reasons cited historically  by governments for requiring
their railways to provide below cost service.  A commercially oriented
enterprise  cannot  survive  such  policies,  because  of  both  Incessant
financial  drain  and  the  Irrational  management  objectives  which  they
entail.  Consequently, the Strategic Plan  must specifically  Identify  those
uneconomic  services  that  are  to be  continued, defIne the  levels of
required support, and  Identify  the public authorities responsible for
providing the funds.  Here  It Is Important to clarify  the scope of any
local  services,  e.g.,  commuter  operations,  which  a  provincial  or  municipal
(or  even private)  party would be willilng  to support, though the national
government  may  not.  Removing  such  services  from  the  budget  of  the
national government  --  a  form  of  "denationalization"  --  would  place
responsibility  for supporting  the service squarely  on the  users and local
authorities that benefit from It  most, and thus are best able to decide
what the service Is  worth.
In  addition,  any  extant  policies  for  providing  preferential  rates  for
the  freight  and  passenger  travel  of  national  government  ministries,
departments,  and  public  corporations  must  be  examined  and  annulled
(unless  the  Government  or  the  agency  Involved  wishes  to  pay  for  them).
Government  organizations  should  pay  for  whatever  railway  services  they
use;  otherwise,  their  budgets  are  recelving  hidden  subsidies  and  efficlent
resource  allocation  Is  diminished.  Furthermore,  It  Is  essentlal  that  the
Government  pay  Its financial  commitments  to  the  rallway on  time --
whether for freight  and passenger services used by government agencies,
6social  service subsidies,  or capital  subventions --  because late  payment
(or  non-payment) forces the railway to borrow funds at high short-term
Interest rates, thus deepening Its  debt position.
The unavoidable truth Is  that for a railway service which does not
cover  Its  costs, either the Government  subsidizes the shortfall  or the
service  must  be  discontinued.  The  SP  provides  the  focal  point  for
resolving  these  difficult  Issues,  Including  careful  definition  of  terms
such  as  "deficit,"  "subsidy,"  and  "compensation"  that  Is  acceptable  to  both
parties.
Labor  Adjustments.  In  transforming the raliway Into a  commercial
enterprise, the work force will  be affected significantly.  Experience In
many countries has shown that fair and equitable treatment of adverse
effects on  labor Is absolutely crucial to  successful completlon of a
railway restructuring  effort.  Government  must  deal with this Issue
directly,  cushloning the  Impacts In light  of the political  and economic
conditlons  which  prevail.  Redundant  rail labor must  be  dismissed,
transferred, or  retrained for work elsewhere  In the economy, and the
underlying  causes  of  the  redundancy  (restrictive  practices  and
government  employment  policies,  among  others) corrected.  Transferral
and/or retralning  and other job  placement assistance Is  best managed as
a  government  responsibillty.  Attritlon, early  retirement, and  job
severance payments may all  have a  role  to play. Government  must decide
and then provide the necessary  programs  and funding. Government  may
also need  to  assume  the  burden  of  any  unfunded  pension  liabilities  for
railway  workers.  If the  Issue of  labor redundancy  Is not  resolved
promptly,  however,  rail  costs  will  .- emain  too  high,  efficient  management
will  be  thwarted,  and  the  railway's  commercial  objective will not  be
achieved.
If railway employees  are  members  of the natlonal Civil Service,
serious consideration should  be given  to removing from the Service those
who  remain with the railway after the restructuring.  Railways cannot
compete successfully  with  private  sector companies that are free of  Clvil
Service restrictions.  The  Civil  Service hiring regulations, rigid  job
classifications  and  work  rules,  and  tightly  circumscribed  promotion
policies,  job  protection  provisions,  and  (often  inadequate)  pay  scales
collectively  tle the  hands  of  a  commercially-orlented  management  which
needs  new  people  with  new  skills  and  maximum  flexibility  to  redefine  task
assignments,  to  reward  the  most  efficient  employees  with  Increased  pay
and  responsibilities,  to  adjust  pay  commensurate  with  prevailing  labor
market conditions,  and to reassign  or terminate those who cannot perform
adequately.  Just as civil  service regulations stifle  productivity In  a
commercIal setting,  so too will  restrictive  labor  union  agreements.  Here
again Government  assistance may  be needed to overcome  obstacles that
would undermine meaningful reform If  left  unchanged.
Relevant  External  Factors
The  Strategic  Plan  must  Identify  and  evaluate  any  exteenal  factors
likely  to  Impinge  on  the  railway's  performance.  It  should  be  remembered
that  railways,  and  all  other  transport  modes,  play  a  supporting  role  In
7the economy.  Their activity Is derived entirely from the  activity of
other  Industries and  businesses  that  have  need  for railway service.
Railways,  therefore,  are  very  much  creatures  of  their  economic
environment.  Indeed,  part of the legacy of deep  financial  distress on
raliways today Is  a product of the old  mythology that they (and  highways
and  other  transport  Infrastructure)  can,  In  anl  of  themselves,  vlrtually
create  benef:clal  economic  activity.  Strategic  planners  must  be  very
attentive  to  external  factors  which  are  capable  of  conditioning  the
demand  for  rali  service  and  make  their  decisions  accordingly.
Economic  Forecasts  and Policies.  Key  government  macroeconomic
po:Icles  and  forecasts  --  e.g.,  for  GDP  and  Interest rates, or  more
specifically,  for  new  trade  and  agricultural policies  which move  the
country from belng  a net importer  of a product to being  a self-provider,
or vice versa  --  can provide Important clues.  Estimates of growth  In
significant  rail  commodities  may  provide  grounds  for  optimism  about
growth  In  traffic.  However,  caution  Is  needed  In Interpreting  such
forecasts.  Fir%.t,  old "rules  of thumb"  for gauging  the Impact  on  railway
activity  of  Increases  In  commodity  output  may  not  apply  any  longer.  The
objective  of  the  restructur-d  railway  Is  not  to  carry  as  many  tons  or
wagon-loads  as possible  or to earn as much gross  revenue as possible.
On the contrary, the aim Is  to attract traffic  that makes a contribution
to  Income above  costs.  Thus  Increasing the tonnage  of money-losing
traffic  Is  not  In  the  Interest  of  the  railway.  Second,  estimates  of  a
strong  rate  of  growth  In  the  economy  may  result  In  little  or  no  change
In  demand  for  rall  service  If  the  growth  Is  most  likely  to  occur  In
Industries  (or  In  service  sectors)  already  heavily  reliant  on  lorry
transport.  In  this  situation,  the  railway  must  carefully  assess  Its
chances, If  any,  of  diverting  such  traffic  from  the  highway  mode.  Third,
"rosy" (colored  with undue optimism)  macroeconomic  forecasts  that are
permitted to become  the basis for substantial Investment 'n rail  plant
and equlpment can  be extremely costly to the  railway and cripple Its
effort to restructure.  Consequently,  considerable realism Is needed In
determining  the  Implications of  macroeconomic  forecasts  for  the
operations of the railway.
Similarly,  forecasts of Increased  consumer disposable Income  may be
of little  practical  value to a railway  If  It  Is  prlmarily  a carrier of bulk
commodities  and  Is gradually withdrawing from unprofitable passenger
operations.  Government  export  promotion  plans could  be  of  special
significance In Increasing the demand  for  rail freight service, again
depending upon the nature of the products Involved  ard the competitive
strength of trucking  and perhaps air  freight.  The Government  should  also
Identify  any plans It  may  have for large scale populatlon  relocation or
remote  area  development,  and  the  extent  to  which  It  expects the railway
system  to  be  Involved  and  on  what  terms.  The  railway  must  not  be
expected  to  subsidize  such activities,  but It  must  adjust  accordingly.
Policy  Toward  the  Competing  Modes  of  Transport.  The  Government's
policies  vis-a-vis  the  highway,  Inland  waterway, and aviation  modes must
be  examined  In  the  Strategic  Plan.  Properly, there  should be a  level
playing  field  for  all  competing  modes.  If  there  Is  not,  and  one  or
8another  benefits  excessively  from  direct  or  Indirect  subsidies,  even  the
best  attempts  at  railway  reform  can  be  a  losing  proposition.  Just  as
the  reformed  railway  Is  expected  to  cover  Its  full  costs,  so  must  the
other modes.  In  many countries,  motor carriers are believed  not to pay
a fair share of the costs  of the hlghway systems  they use or of the
environmental costs  they generate, and  to benefit from  lax  (or  non-
existent)  standards relating  to vehicle  registration,  axle-loading,  safety,
and financial  fitness.  These  advantages  benefit highway trans-porta-
tion  and disadvantage the railway. Furthermore, government bucgets must
bear  the costs  of any  such privileges  permitted by uncoordinated and
Inconsistent  modal promotional,  subsidy, loan,  grant,  and tax policies.
Planners  must approach the level  playing  fleld  question  with  caution
and finesse. For example,  the deficiencies  In  the railway  today which  are
a  legacy of Its past, and the practical fact that It  may  take a  period
of time before It Is  properly prepared to compete commercially  on even
terms  with  Its unregulated competitors, may  warrant  some  privileged
treatment  for It Initially  from the Government.  Looking to the future,
however,  It must  be established that the rallway also Is expected  to
stand on Its  own, without undue support, vis-a-vis the other modes.
Apart  from  the  Issue  bf  unequal  treatment  among  modes,  the
strategic planners must consider any Government  plans for expansion or
Improvement of highway and secondary road systems.  If  such plans  exist,
a  realistic  assessment  of  their  effects  --  largely In  terms of freight
(and  perhaps  passenger)  diversion  --  on  the  railway  will  be  In  order.  Of
course  highway  and  road  expansion  may  also  serve  as  a  reassuring
palliative  In  areas where curtailment  of uneconomic services or closure
of uneconomic rail  branch lines  Is  necessary.
Although  not a government policy  Issue,  It  Is  also prudent for those
preparing the SP to assess  candidly the strength and viability  of the
railway's  competitors. After making  allowance for  any subsidies  they may
be  recelving,  how  efficient are  the  other  modes  and  the  fIrms which
operate  In  them?  What are their cost structures?  How committed are
shippers  and  travelers  to  using  lorries,  water  transport,  aircraft,
buses, and other private means of transportation?  What Is  the range of
competitive  countermeasures which the railway's  competitors are likely  to
I  take In reaction to the restructured railway's  new market  Initlatives?
(Competitive markets,  by  nature,  are  dynamic  rather  than  static.
Continuous  change  becomes  commonplace.  The  railway's commercially
operated  competitors  are  far more  experienced  In operating  In this
environment.) On a level  playing  field,  to what extent are they  likely  to
sustain an advantage over  rail  In  various market/service sectors?  An
enterprise operated on commercial  principles  must "listen  to the  market."
It  Is foolish  to persist In  offerlng services which the market no longer
wants,  or  prefers  to  obtaln  from  another  mode.  It  makes sense to serve
those  markets  where  demand  exists,  assuming  competitive  prices  and
acceptable quallty  of service. Accurate knowledge of the  capabilities  of
one's  competitors will  make  It  more  likely  that  realistic  Judgments about
the  attractiveness  of  potentlai  rail market/service  niches will be
forthcoming from the strategic analysis.
9It  Is  also  vitally  Important  that  the  planners  assess  the  degree  to
which  the  demand  for  transport  Is  distorted.  If,  for  example,  most of  the
freight  shippers  or receivers  are government agencies,  and If  these
agencies  experience  no effective  pressure to minimize  their  cost of
transport, then  the  market  will not  respond as  expected to  a
commerclally  oriented  railway.  In  many countries,  correcting  distortions
on the demand  side can play an  Important  role In the process of
restructuring  the rallway's  Interactlon  with Its  markets.
Special  Economic Administrative  Constraints.  Many  existing  general
Government  restrictlons  on  economic  and  financial  activity  can  constrain
the  effectiveness  of  a railroad  that  Is  being  restructured  to  operate  on
commercial principles.  The  Strategic Plan must  Identify  all such
discriminatory  restrictions  that  are  relevant  to  the  railway.  Elther
walvers  (full  or  partial)  will  have  to  be  granted  to  the  railway  and
others  so  situated,  or  the Impacts  of the restrictlons  on  the  railway
must be calculated  and the enterprises's  objectives  and  performance
expectatlons  scaled  back  accordingly.  The types  of restriction  at Issue
Include,  but  are  not limited  to,  the  following:  availability  of  foreign  ex-
change  (especially  as It  relates  to  the  railway's  ability  to  acquire  spare
parts),  Import  controls,  permissible  sources of foreign  and domestic
borrowing,  ratloning,  wage  controls,  and  Irocurement  regulations  requiring
"local  only"  and/or  "low  bid"  purchases.
Other  Relevant  Factors.  Each country should  Identify  any other
external  factors  of  relevance  to  Its  railway  and  ensure  that  they  are
carefully  considered  In  the  development  of  the  SP. For  example,  railways
dependent on connections  with foreign  railway  systems for Important
volumes of  traffic must  evaluate realistically  the  likely  future
performance  of their  Interchange  partners,  recognizing  that the future
course  of International  relations  Is  not  easy to  predict.  Is  the  foreign
system reliable? Can It  handle  the Increased  traffic  and/or  meet the
service  quality  standards  envisioned  by the restructured  enterprise?
How crucial  are the routing  policies  of foreign  railways  and thelr
governments and are they subject  to unilateral  change?  Are there
capacity  constraints  on the  foreign  railway  or  at a  port  which  It  serves
and through  which  our traffic  must flow?  Are the revenue divisions
between the two systems equitable? Can they be renegotiated? The
answers to such questions  can significantly  condItlon  the performance
expectations  of the restructuring  rallway  and  must not be Ignored.
One planning  factor  pertinent  to  all  railways  Is  the  assumption  made
about  technological  change.  Are  major  changes  In  technology  anticipated
that will  significantly  alter  the efficlency  or quality  of rail  service
vls-a-vis  competing  modes of transport?  Are other modes  likely  to
benefit  from such changes to the net disadvantage  of rail? Will  new
technologies  put a  premium on  the development  of new cooperative
relationships  between  modes and new joint  services?  Above all,  It  Is
unwise  to assume  continual  advance In  rail  technology  and little  or no
progress In  other  modal  technologies.
10The  rapid  globalization of  domestic  economies  Is  spawning  a
challenging  new  set of logistics  problems.  Varlous concepts  of total
cost,  Integrated logistics  management  have been developed to deal with
them. 10 Freight  shippers,  In  particular,  are  demanding  more  services  and
greater  efficlencies  In  the  performance  of  the  logistics  chains  In  which
they  participate.  Both  the  restructured  railway  and  Its  competitors  are
likely  to be affected by this thinking,  sooner or,  later.  Whether  this
development  will result In business  opportunities  for  the  railway,  or
disadvantage It  significantly,  Is  a  matter for prudent consideration.
Assess  the  Strengths  and  Weaknesses  of  the  Railway
Typically,  In  the  strategic  planning  processes  within  major  private
corporatlons,  evaluation  of  essential  external  factors  Is  balanced  by  a
clear-eyed assessment  of the Internal  strengths and weaknesses  of the
corporation  Itself. This same  step makes  sense  In the Strategic Plan.
Almost by definition,  many of the railways  being  converted  to  commercial
enterprlses are not In  top-flight  condition. They carry the scars of the
deficiencies  which the restructuring  effort Is  Intended  to correct.  With
this sort of legacy, they need to be strengthened to the point where
they may  fairly  test  their ability  to succeed as commercial entitles.
Government  assistance may  be necessary  for this purpose.  Beyond  the
Immediate Issue  of the  railway's  current  capabilities,  the  Strategic  Plan
must also  consider future  opportunitles  for the  enterprise to exploit  and
future vulnerabilitles  which It  must prepare to avert. 11 Indeed,  "Et3here
Is  an enormous payoff to the skilled  probing  of opportunitles  and threats
In a company's future and  relating t2hem  In an unbiased study  of the
company's  strengths  and  weaknesses." 1 2
Several  of  the  elements  which  help  to  determine  a  rallway's  profile
have  been  noted  above,  e.g.,  excessive  levels  of  debt,  redundant
personnel,  too  much  physical  plant,  and  operating  and  other  costs  that
exceed  revenues.  However,  other  factors  should  be Identified  during  the
strategic  planning  effort  which  make  the  status  of  the  railroad  ab-
solutely  clear.  For  Instance,  the  age,  number,  and  avallabilly  of
locomotives  and  ot;her  equipment;  the  extent  of  deferred  maintenance  of
way  and  the  general  operating  condition  of  rail  plant;  the  availability  of
suitable  computer  systems;  and  the  quallfications  of  personnel  at  all
levels  of  the  organization,  In  light  of  the  requirement  that  they  operate
a  commercial  enterprise.
With  this  Informatlon  "on  the  table,"  decisions  must  be  made  In  the
SP about the need for special  steps to remedy the critical  deficiencies.
Some may  require significant  capital Investment  (discussed  below).  Other
changes,  no  less  significant,  are  likely  to  be  primarily  Institutional  In
nature.  A  major  Issue  will  be  the  availability  of  people,  from  top
management  on  down,  who  can  function  effectively  In  a  competitive
commercial  environment.  While  the  detalls  of  Internal  reorganization  are
best  left  to  the  railway's  Management  Plan,  analysis  and  discussion  at
the  SP  stage  Is necessary  to  ascertain  whether  Government  assistance
Is required (and to reassure Government  that the restructured railway
can  function  and  succeed  as  a  business  entity).  Marketing,  pricing,  sales,
11and customer  service skills  will  be urgently needed on the restructured
rallway. People prepared and wliIlng  to act and react quickly  and flexibly
to meet changing market demand conditions  are essential.  If  they cannot
or will  not,  business  will  be lost  to the  competition,  perhaps Irrevocably.
Can such people be hired In-country,  from other commercIal enterprises;
can existing  railway staff be tralned and, If  so,  what types of training
are required;  are consultants necessary, both to serve as expert staff
for an Interim  period,  as well as to train;  can speclal arrangements  be
made  with  local universities to  prepare  students  for  careers  In
marketing,  sales,  and customer service?  If  the latter  option is  selected,
the  railway must  be prepared  to pay  competitive salarles lest other
businesses bid these  graduates away.  This provides an example of the
critical  need for freedom for the rallway to hire and fire and to train
and develop Its  personnel without regard to Clvil  Service regulations.
Similarly, most  state-owned  raliways  that  become  commercial
enterprises will  need a significant  up-grading In  the ability  to measure
the cost of their services.  Accurate knowledge of costs  Is the key to
Identification  of  traffic and  services  which  can  earn  a  profit (or
contribution  to  net  Income) above  costs.  The  objective  of  the
restruc-.ured  railway Is to maximize  such desirable traffic  and services
while  ellminating  those  which  cannot  pass  this  test.  As  with  the
marketing  and  sales  skills  noted  above,  special  efforts  may  be  needed  to
put people with these skills  (and relevant computer support) In  place  as
qulckly  as possible.
The Internal  cultural  revolution  required  on a  railway  that accepts
the challenge of operating as a commercial  enterprlse also  extends Into
the operating and engineering  departments.  The  difficulty  Involved In
achieving  the necessary changes  In  operating and engineering skills  and
attitudes  should  not  be  underestimated.  Most  railways  have  been
"production  led;"  that Is,  the customer  Is  expected  to  adapt  to  whatever
services  the  railway  chooses  to  supply,  rather  than  the  reverse.  A
commercially  oriented  or  umarket  ledu  railway,  on  the  other  hand,  focuses
on  the  customer's  demand  for  services  and  develops  the  optimum  resulting
combination  of  price  and  cost  needed  to  meet  the  customer's
transportatlon  requirements  (even  If  this Implies  that  costs  are  not
minimized).3
Unfortunately,  the  best  marketing  theories  and  most  Innovative
sales packages that can be devised have no meaning If  the  quality  of  the
rall operations  actually performed  Is faulty.  Quallty  In operations
depends on having railway  operational  personnel who are as sensitive  to
costs and to the needs  of the shipper or traveler as Is the marketing
specialist. In  the phraseology of British  Rail:
Our Quality  strategy Is  not about meeting general targets for
service  punctuality  and  equipment  availability agreed
Internally  between  the  Business  and  Production  functions.  It
Is  about  meeting,  time  after  time,  the  Individual  specification
agreed  with  the  Individual  customer. 14
12Trains that are late,  use the wrong equipment,  lose  or mis-route wagons,
or tolerate lengthy  terminal  delays will  destroy the best-laid  plans  with
shippers,  drive  the  business  away  to  lorries, Inflate costs,  and
contribute to the rapid  demise of the enterprise. Rallways  which do not
offer the services that customers want,  will  soon have no customers, or
at  least too  few  to Justify  continued operation of the  railway on a
commercial basis.
The Strategic Plan must conclude that the sort of tcp management
leadership needed  to  Infuse all levels of  the  railway wlth  the  new
entrepreneurial spirit,  and to focus them all  In  Integrated fashion on a
single-minded,  shared  commercial  objective,  Is  available  or  Identify  a  way
to find them.  Special Incentives  may  be needed to attract and retain
such people.
Develop  An  Enterprise  Forecast
The  SP  should  Include  a  multi-year (between three  and ten years)
pro  forma  forecast  of  the  Income  statement,  balance  sheet,  and  funds
flow  statement  for  the  restructured  enterprise.  This  forecast  Is  not
Intended  to  serve  as  a  management  plan.  Rather  Its  purpose  Is  to
provide  an  overview  of  the  results  likely  to  flow  from  the  mix  of
decisions,  assumptions,  and  policy  options  developed  earlier  In  the  SP.
Various  "mixes,"  of  course,  are  possible,  and  their  respective  forecasts
will  provide the strategic planners with clearer understandings of the
consequences  of their  choices In  quant.itative  terms, e.g.,  from changes
In labor  force  levels,  major  line  abandonments,  or  Introduction of
entirely  new services, and help  to reshape their  choices.  The forecasts
can also be used to explaln  the restructuring effort to the public  and
all other  Interested  parties, and  they  can  Illustrate the  budget
Implications  of Government  decisions to support particular uneconomic
services.
Prepare  a  Capital  Plan
The capital plan Is  a statement of the capital resources required
to carry out the levels  of activity  foreseen In  the enterprise forecast.
It should address  each line  of business, by year and by major  Item of
Investment,  as  well  as  any  special  expenditures  undertaken  to  give  the
railway  an  Immediate  boost  In capability.  A  discussion  of  the
justification  for  each  Investment  should be  Included,  as  well as  an
Indicatlon  of  the  source  of  the  capital,  .e.,  Government,  railway,  or  some
combInation  of  the  two.  If  It  Is  decided  that  the  railway  will  not  be
expected,  at  least  initlally,  to  finance  all  of  Its  capital  requirements
from  customer  revenues,  then  some  Government  capital  subvention  will  be
necessary.  The  cost  of  any  new  borrowing  by  the  railway  should  be
reflected  In  the  pro  forma  Income  statement.
Review the  Safety  and  Environmental  Aspects  of  the  Railway
Given  that  economic  deregulation  of  the  railway's  activities  Is
essential  to  Its  successful  operation  on  commercial  principles,  It  does
not  follow  that  safety and environmental regulation should necessarily
13be  relaxed In the  same  degree, or  at all.  Safety  and  environmental
protection are  significant  public  values.  If anything, they  should be
constantly  Improved and strengthened, and regulation  may  be necessary
for  this purpose.  There  Is,  however, one  Important caveat  to  this
proposition;  namely, that safety/environmental regulatlon should not be
permitted  to mask  or  disguise other  kinds of  Interventions, such as
restrictive  labor  practices  Imposed  In the  guise  of  "safety," that
effectively constrain  the  raliroad's  abillty to  functlon as  a  well-
managed  commercial  entIty.
14PLAN  2
THE CONTRACT PLAN
When  the  strategic  planning effort  begins  to  converge  on  a
generally accepted  approach, the development of the Contract  Plan (CPJ
should begin.  The Contract  Plan,  as the word  "contract"  denotes, Is a
formal  ratification  by the railway  and the  Covernment of their  respective
obligations.  Strictly speaking, It  Is nolt a  "plan" but  rather  an
Implementing  or  "agreed actions" document.  It states  their mutual
acceptance  of the entrepreneurial mission and objectives developed  In
the Strategic Plan, clarifies the  authority and  responsibillty  of the
railway, stipulates the  performance  levels expected  of  the  railway,
specifles  the commitments undertaken by the Government, and establishes
a  time period for the duration of the contract (probably  three to five
years).
Contract Plans have been used In  a  number of countries since the
1970's. For  the most  part, It Is generally conceded  that these  plans
have fallen  short of expectations,  apart from Improving the quality  of
communications between government and railway. This record Is  due to a
number of causes, Including  failure  to deal  well  (or  at all)  with strategic
Issues,  undue  government  Involvement  In  detailed  Internal  management
matters  best  left  to  the  Management  Plan,  failure  to  relieve  the  railway
of restrictions  on Its  ability  to make decisions  or a  failure  of the rail-
way  to respond  effectively to the opportunities created  by such new
freedom as was  offered by the CP, and the Inability  of governments  to
keep  the  commitments  that  they  had made  In the  CP. 16 The  authors
believe that development of  a  Strategic  Plan,  along  the  lines  suggested
earlier  In  this report,  will  greatly Improve the likelihood  that a concise
and effective Contract Plan can be negotiated by the parties.
A workable CP should meet three tests.  Flrst, Its  terms  must  be
clear,  complete,  and  mutually  consistent.  Ambiguity,  Incompleteness,  or
contradictory  terms  which  serve  to  conceal  problems  or  postpone
confronting  difficult  Issues  must  be  avoided.  Second,  both  parties  must
have  the  authority,  capability,  and  willingrness  to  carry  out  their
commitments.  Otherwise,  the  CP has  no  meaning.  Commitments  that  cannot
be  kept  are  best  not  made.  Third,  the  CP  must  not  be  an  unduly  rigid
document.  It  should  Include  provision  for  making  mutually  agreed  upon
adjustments  In  the  light  of  experience.  This  Is  In  recognition  of  the
fact  that  both  the  Government  and  the  railway are  setting out  on
relatively  uncharted waters, namely, to operate a major  enterprise on
the basis of commercial principles  for  the  first  time.  The  two  partles
should assune  that some of the Initial  assumptions used  In  the SP will
prove  to be too optimistic  or  too  conservative,  anI  that  there  will  be
unexpected (perhaps  unpleasant)  developments as the enterprise tests Its
mettle  In a  commercial environment.  Thelr  responsibility  when  such
occasions arise Is to work together to plot the necessary corrections
In  course, exploring  the available  options In  the same spirit  as was done
In  fashioning the Strategic Plan.
15If  these  three  tests  cannot  be  met,  there  Is  no  point  In
slgning  a  Contract  Plan.
Affirm  the  Mission Statent  and ObJectives
The CP will  adopt the mission statement for the railway  enterprise
developed  In  the Strategic Plan. That Is,  to provide efficient  transport
by replicating  the behavior of a commercial,  profit-oriented enterprlse
operating under  conditlons of adequate  competition.  In effect, this
mission provides the Incentive  for the rallway to provide Its  services
In  the  most  efficient  way.
The  Government  and  the  railway  also  jointly  adopt  the  definitlon  of
the  objective  or  objectives  which  the  railway  Is  to  achleve,  as  presented
In  the  SP.  One  piruslble  definition  Is  to  recover  from  revenues  funds  In
an amount  sufficient  to pay  the costs  of providing the service, meet
Interest and principal  payments or debt,  and contribute to (or  cover  In
full)  new  Investment  In the  ralilway. The  parties may  wish to  set  a
target percentage  return on  1 ssets  for the Railway or provide other
refinements to the definitlon.  In  some situations It  may be desirable
to  phase  In  achievement  of  the  objective  over  time,  In  effect  recogniz-
Ing  a  transition  period  before  full  commercial  operation  Is  attained.  If
this approach  Is used, the Interim  targets should  be spelled  out  In  the
CP.  Note  that  while  the  railway's  primary  objective  typically  Is
expressed  In  financial  terms,  It  necessarily  subsumes  achievement  by  the
organization  of  critical  subordinate  goals  such  as  motivating  the  work
force,  developing  marketable  services,  and  building  customer  satisfac-
tion.  (These  are  matters  best  dealt  with  In  the  Management  Plan.)
Most  CP's  will  also  assign  the  railway  the  objective  of  providing
certain  services  specified  and  supported  by  the  Government,  as
efficlently  as  possible.  The  Government  may  wish  t  establish  a  series
of goals for phasing down the size  of Its  subsidies1 or for phasing out
particular  services,  19 over time.  These targets would be stated In  the
CP.
Delineate  the  Railway's  Authowity
The CP must enumerate the areas In  which the Railway  will  have the
authority  to  make  decisions,  as  distinguished  from  those  where
Government  review  or  approval  will  continue  to  be  necessary.  It Is a
sound  general  principle  of effective administration that responsibillty
and authority be located at the same place. This  principle  Is  absolutely
crucial to  the  successful operatlon  of  a  competitive, profit-making
enterprise.  It must  have  the authority to make  the decisions which
control fulfillment  of Its  responsibilities.  Obviously the railway  must be
held accountable ex post  for any public  funds It uses, but  It  must  be
freed  to  the  maximum  extent  possible  of  the  need  for  ex  ante
consultation with Government  about Its  activities,  just as would be the
16case  for a private sector enterprise which viewed the Government  as a
customer, and not as an owner.
Among  the  types  of  railway authority  likely  to  be  listed and
descrlbed In  the CP are the following:
(1)  Freedom  to  set  and  change  prices  on  Its  commercial  (non-
supported)  freight and  passenger  services,  to  negotiate
confidential  contract  rates  with freight customers,  and  to
market services as It  sees fit.
(2)  Freedom  to  hire,  fire,  train,  classify,  pay,  assign,  promote,
and  organize  Its  labor  force.
(3)  Freedom  to  borrow  funds.
(4)  Freedom  to  engage  In  commercial  ancillary  services  with  its
assets.
(5)  Freedom  to  enter  Into  contractual  arrangements  wlth  private
sector  companies  to  obtain  services  that  It needs,  artd  to
offer  new  Joint  and  cooperative  logistics  services  to  cus-
tomers,
(6)  Freedom  to  alter  the  physlcal  size  of  the  railway  system  and
the  size  and  consist  of  Its  fleet  of  locomotives  and  other
equipment.
(7)  Freedom to  cease railway  services  that  do  not  meet  commercial
objectives,  and  for  which  Government  does  not  choose  to
provice  financial  support.
Establish  the  Railway's  Performance  Standards
For  unsupported  rail services, the only standard  needed  Is the
previously set  objective of  the  enterprise.  Either  It acnieves  an
adequate  return  on  Investment  (or  some  other  measure  of  profitability),
or  It  does  not.  To  achieve  this  objective,  by  definition  It  must operate
efficiently,  Invest  capital  wisely,  provide  quality  service,  and  market  and
price aggressively.  Such traditional  measures  as volume or ridership
"commitments," number  of  on-time  departures  and  arrivals, etc. are
unnecessary  In  the  CP,  though they may appear In  the Internal  Management
Plan.  Baslcally,  they are variables which are under the discretion and
control of the management  of the commercially  operated railway. Indeed,
as  noted  In  the  Strategic  Plan,  a  goal  to  achleve  a  fixed  Increase  In
tonnage,  wagonloads,  or  gross  revenue  would  be  self-defeating  for  the
enterprise If  the  only  way  to  obtain  It  was  to  carry  the  traffic  at  a
rate  below  the  costs  of  providing  the  service.  The  simplicity  and  clarity
of  the  goal  "to  earn  a  profit"  (or  positive  net  Income)  Is  one  of  Its
major  attractions.  Success  or  failure  Is  very  easy  to  see.
The  Government  and  the  railway  should  agree  on  a  separate
performance  measure  for  those  unprofitable  rail  services  which  the
Government  chooses  to  support  for  reasons  of  political  and  social  policy
or  because  a  transition  period Is  needed  before  they  can  become  self-
sustaining. The demand forecasting,  service quallty levels,  and pricing
of such services becomes the responsibility  of the Government, and the
railway simply serves  as  a  contractor  to  the  Government  for  the
17provision  of the services.  Its  obligation  as a contractor  Is  to operate
as efficiently  as possible.
The two parties must negotiate the terms of the contract, covering
the fares/rates (and  hence revenue)  which  the Government will  permit,  the
Rallway's  estimated  cost  of  providing  the  service  (greater  than  revenue),
and  the  differential  between  revenue  and  cost  which  the  Government  Is
obilgated  to  pay.  Of  course,  the  Government could reduce the size  of  the
differential  on  passenger  service  deficits  by  ellminating  the  "free  pass"
and  narrowing  the  range of riders eligible  for fare discounts and the
size of  the  discount.  For  Its  part,  the  railway  could  Improve  the
effectiveness of fare collection  to reduce the draln of lost revenue
from fare evasion.  The Government could also narrow the differential  by
offering Incentives to the railway either to cut Its  costs  more  or to
carry more passengers  (or frelght)  for the same cost.  For example,  the
Government  could authorize the railway to keep a  percentage  share of
any cost savings It  achieved below a  designated target level  of costs
for  the service,  or of revenue galned  from Improved  fare  collection.  The
Issue  of devising  effective Incentives  In  a  supported services situatlon
Is  complex. The Government wants costs minim;zed  without degradation of
service below agreed normative levels. The incentives  should  be devised
to encourage  the railroad  to reduce costs  and Increase revenue (with-
in the  limits  of the Government's pricing pollcy)  without reducing the
quality  of service.  Of course, allowing  the raliway an opportunity to
earn some profit  on Its  Government  contract operatlons would serve as
a stimulus to the  railway  to  not  neglect  efficient  management  of  the
supported services.
Critical to  achieving the  objectives  of  both  unsupported  and
supported services  Is  proper determination of their costs.  Therefore
the CP should Indlcate  the cost allocation  methods which will  be used to
develop "profit  centers" for the  commercial  services  and  "cost  centers"
for  the  Government's  supported  services  (to  permit  both  proper  audit  and
public  justification).  Both  sides  must  understand  that  perfect  alloca-
tions  of cost are not possible,  In  theory or In  practice,  because of the
many  joint  and  common  costs  Involved  In  railway  operation.  Experience
will  gradually  provide  a  basis  for  adjusting  and  refining  the  allocations.
It  Is,  after all,  not essential that the allocations  be perfect --  they
only need to produce predictable  results and proper Incentives. In  the
meanwhile,  aGreement  on one  or another commonly accepted methodology
will  suffice.  °  In  some  cases,  agreement  will  also  be  needed  on  a
schedule  for  phasing-In  the  full  application  of the  costing  system.  At
the outset  of the reform process, the railway will  have  actual costs
which are  too  high,  but which cannot  be reduced Immediately.  Raising
rates  overnight  would  elther  lose  traffic,  or  force  rates  to  be  too  high:
an  appropriate  phasing  plan  would  permit  costs  to  fall  before  rates  are
Increased.  For  the  Government's  supported  traffic,  the  CP  should
Indicate  the  extent  to  which  the  railway  will  be  held  responsible  for  Its
initlal  cost  proJections  and  settle  on  the  techniques  to  be  used  for
adjusting  costs  for  any  variances  In  the  projected  volume  of  social
traffic.  These  techniques  no  doubt  will  have  to  be  adjusted  periodically
to take account of actual experience.  Properly, "costs" for supported
18services will  cover  the fully  allocated operating and capital  costs  of
these  services.  It should also be decided whether  an  allowance for
profit  will  be Included.
Rallway  Commitments
In  return  for Its  broader and clearer authority,  and In  the light  of
Its  performance  standards,  the  railway  must  undertake  certain
colmnitments. These would Include,  among others:
(1)  Aggressive  and  professional  efforts  to  melt  the  performance
standards,  such  as  the  financial  targets  or  agreed  quality of
service standards on supported services.
(2)  Effective  management  of operations, such as efficient labor  force
size  and  working  conditions,  professionally  managed  procurements,
and  efficient  acqulsitlon  and  use  of  capital  resources,  however
derived.
(3)  Mutually  advantageous  relationship  with  customers,  I.e.  quality
services  at  competitive  rates  for  commerclal  customers,  and  fully
satisfactory  deHvery  of  services  to  contract  customers  (including
the government, where  supported services are provided).
(4)  Monopoly positions,  If  any,  will  not  be  abused.
(5)  Forthright  and  transparent  relationship  with  the  government,
Including accurate  financial and  operatlonal  Information  as
necessary to verify  performance against  standards or targets,  good
faith  projections  of  costs and revenues for supported services,  and
accurate estimates of capital  requirements.
(6)  Fair and  responsible relationship  with the  labor force, Including
pay,  conditions  of  work,  and  Incentives  (both  for  labor  and
management).
Government Commitments
As  the  relationship  between  the  Government  and  the  railway
changes,  the  Government  will  have  certain  obligations  to  fulfill  which  will
be  critical  to  achievement  of  the  goals  of  the  Strategic  Plan.  Some  of
these  actions  may  require legislation,  budget allocations,  cancellation,
amendment,  or  waiver  of  regulations,  Issuance  of  directives  to
government  departments,  promulgation  of  new  policy  statements,  or
reorganization  of government departments.  The Government's commitments
could very well Include  some  or  all  of  the  following:
(1)  Deregulation  of  rates  and  fares,  service  levels,  and  decisions
to abandon rail  plant  and services that are not supported by
government.
(2)  Changes  In rail  safety regulation.
(3)  Changes  In  government  policy  toward  non-rail  modes  of
transportatlon  In terms  of  economic  regulation, taxation,
promotlon,  safety, etc.
(4)  Assumption of past railway  debt obligations.
(5)  Capital  Investment  payments  In  the  railway  (amount  and
schedule).
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and schedule).
(7)  Removal  of  railway  personnel  from  Clvil  Service  Jurlsdiction,
and  assumption  of  unfunded  Civil  Service  pension  liabilitIes.
(8)  Funding and other arrangements  for a program to reduce the
rail  labor  force, Including  transfer,  reemployment assistance,
retraining,  severance payment provisions,  etc.
(9)  Definition of  procedures  for  assuring  timely payment  by
government ministries  for charg-s owed to the railway.
(10)  Cancelling,  waiving,  or  modifying  certain general regulations,
e.g.,  on foreign exchange availability,  Imports,  procurement,
borrowing.
(11)  Formal  authorization for  the  railway to  obtain  goods  and
services from private contractors, to enter Into  cooperative
arrangements  with third party transportation companies  and
logistics  services providers,  and to use Its  assets freely  for
commercial purposes (leasing  space,  selling  or developing Its
real estate, etc.).
Finally,  the  Government  must  commit  to  prompt  preparation  and
Implementation  of  the  Enabilng  Actions  Plan  (discussed  below)  which  will
clear  the  way  for  a  rapid  start-up  of  the  railway's  operation  as  a  truly
commercial  enterprise.  The  Government  should  also  designate  --  and
endow wlth the appropriate authority --  a  single  department, agency,  or
Interministerial  group to serve as Its  principal  spokesman and point of
contact with the  railway.  The  railway must  be protected  against the
need to deal with multiple  government offices,  each claiming  to speak on
behalf  of or as "the"  Government.  There should  be a single  authoritative
Government  voice  for  railway  matters,  one  capable  of  resolving  any
differences  within  the  Government  as  well as  requirlng government
agencies  to  meet  their  respective  obligations  vis-a-vis  the  railway.
This  authority  could  also  be  charged with making the  factual findings
associated  with  tariff  protests  or  line  abandonments.
For  example, Kenya  has  recently  taken  the  Innovative  step  of
establishing  a Railway  Monitoring  Group (RMG)  to oversee  the performance
of both  the railway and  the Government  In fulfilling  their respective
obligations  under the terms of the Memorandum  of Understanding signed
by  both  parties.  A  similar group  Is envisioned  In Nigeria.  Given
adequate authority and resources to do their Job,  Independent agencies
of this type can play very constructive roles In  promoting a successful
outcome from the railway restructuring  process.
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In  line  with  the  unification  of  the  railway/government  relationship
Is the  need  to assess  the  structure of  the  Board  of Directors, or
Managing Board. Many railways  have traditionally  functioned  under Boards
which  are  either  wholly  staffed  by  railway  personnel  (which  tends  to
reduce  the  railway's responsiveness  to  external  forces, and  often
undermines  the  authority  of  the  chief executive) or  which, however
staffed, have  very  limited  authority (some boards, for example, focus
entirely  on procurement  Issues,  and have no policy  authority).  Neither
situation  Is conducive  to  proper  management  of  a  market-oriented
enterprise.  It  Is  likely  that a  new Board,  Including  authoritative  outside
appointments  and  with  a  broader  role  In  policy  decisions,  may  need  to  be
Instituted.
Contingency Provisions
The  CP  should  Include  a  section  which  Identifies  the  procedures  to
be  used  In  the  event  of  a  major  failure,  either  In  meeting  the  terms  of
the  document  or  due  to  some  external  event  which  renders  It  moot.
For  Instance,  what  Is  to  be  done  If  the  Government  falls  to  make
subsidy  payments  or  a  major  capital  Investment  payment?  In  that  event,
can  (or  must)  the  Railway  discontinue  the  affected  service?  How will  the
Government  acquire the funds necessary to fulfill  Its  commitments?
Similarly,  to  what  degree  will the  railway be  required to  take
responsibility  for  the  cost  and  profitability  projections  for  the  non-
supported  commerclal  services?  How  long  should  large  losses  be
permitted to accrue?  Will  the Government make good those losses (or  a
part of them, at least for a  limited  period)?  Should there be a loss
"cut-off point beyond which the railway  will  not be permitted to go and
a  given commercial service suspended or terminated?
And  what  Is to be done  to cope  with significant  change  In the
external  environment?  For  example,  the  CP  between  the  French
government  and  SNCF  conceivably could be made  meaningless  If their
mutual estimates  of the  Impact  of  the  lntegrateJ  European  market  on
transportation In  France In  the  early  1990's  were  orders  of  magnitude In
error.  Any country faced with such events should  move with great speed
to reframe both the Strategic Plan and the Contract Plan.
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THE MANAGEMENT  PLAN
The  Management  Plan  (MP) Is  an  Internal  document  prepared  by  and
for the railway.  In It  the activity  plans In  the Strategic Plan and the
performance commitments In  the  Contract Plan  are converted Into  detailed
operational targets for each of the railway's  departments
Normally the MP will  have a three  to five year planning horizon.
The performance targets for  the first  year of  operation  as a  commerclal
enterprise will  take account of the Inevitable  start-up  problems which
can be  expected as  the railway transitions to Its new role.  The "out
years" will also  be  revised each  year  to account  for year  to  year
changes (internal  and external)  and experience gained.
Establish  the  Organizational  Framwork
It  Is  almost  certain  that  on  most  railways  the  switch  to  a
commercial  mode  of  operatlon  will  warrant  changes  In  the  organizatlonal
framework of the entity. The railway's  "complex  structures hamstrung by
tradition  are  particularly  In  need  of  a  face-lift  to  encoura e
transparency,  flexibillty  and,  above  all,  results-led  thinking."
Particular attention must  be  given to  the  marketing, sales, pricing,
customer  service,  costing,  and management  Information  systems functions
which  are  so critical  to the success  of the  restructured enterprlse.
New  departments  and authorities may  be necessary  to Insure that the
status of these  functlons Is elevated to the highest level. While the
actual form of these organizational  units Is  open to discussion,  It  seems
Increasingly clear  that  some  form of  "business sector" organization
deserves  careful consideratlon.  For  example, this might  take  the
simplest form of  freight versus  passengers:  It could be made  more
elaborate  as  appropriate,  as  In British  Rail's Freight,  Intercity
passengers,  Network  South  East, Provincial and  Parcel's Organization.
As another example,  American railroads are tending to merge  "marketing
and sales" Into a single  department oriented to major customers  (often
called  "national  accounts").  This  has  the  advantage  that  customers  have
a  single  point  of  contact  to  deal  wlth  Inside  the  railway;  moreover,  from
a  management  point  of  view,  administrative  "turf"  battles  between
separate  customer-oriented  departments  are  avoided  and  employees  are
further  Imbued  with  the  Idea  that  they  have  a  common  purpose  --  to
serve  the  customer  and earn  profits  for  the  railway.  "Costing"  Is  often
located  In  the  finance  department  and  sometimes  In  the  systems
department.  Costing  also  warrants  careful  thought  because  It  Is  a  func-
tion that  has  long  been  Ignored  In  countries  where  rigid  economic
regulation  of  railways  has  predominated.  It  Is  only  when  positive  net
Income  becomes  the  objective  of  the  enterprise  that  the  Importance  of
knowing  actual  costs  --  and  controlling  them  --  becomes  significant.  One
of  the  blggest  challenges  to  the  privately  owned  American  railroads  since
their  relative  deregulation  In  recent  years  has  been  to  overcome  decades
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measurement  systems  for  use  by  railway  management.  For a  competitive
railway,  profitability  Information  must  be  accurate,  specific,  timely,  and
accessible to Its  users  throughout  the  organization. The restructuring
state-owned  railways  will  have to confront the same challenge and must
give  this  function  adequate  status  and  support  within  their  or-
ganizations.
Finally,  the administration  and  personnel departments on the railway
have to be evaluated and, where  necessary, reinforced,  because of the
central roles they must assume.  Administration  must focus on reducing
overhead costs throughout the  organization.  As the restructured railway
begins Its  new life,  reductions In  overhead are as Important  as new sales
because overhead  costs directly reduce net Income. Assuming constant
revenue,  for  example,  a  $1000  reduction  In overhead  automatically
Increases  profits  by  $1000.  Of  course,  while  the  administratlon
department  attacks general overhead costs, all  other departments must
share  In  the effort to cut costs within  the scope of their  own respon-
sibility  and be given Incentive  and assistance  In  dolng so.
The  personnei  department  has  the  critical task  of  seeking to
strengthen  the  railIway's  human  resources  so  that  It can  perform
successfully  under  competitive  conditions.  Its  assignments  are
formidable:  dispense wlth redundant labor,  retrain some workers for new
Jobs within  the railway,  recruit new employees (often for new or newly
expanded positions In  areas  such  as  marketing,  customer  service,  costing,
etc.),  replace a  Civil  Service organizational  culture with one geared to
the  operation  of  a  commercial  enterprise,  devise  salary,  development,
promotion,  performance  Incentive,  and  employee  benefits  systems,  etc.
Personnel  must  work  very  closely  with  each  of  the  other  department
heads and give them the utmost support as they strive to transform the
railway Into  an effective competitive enterprise.
Freedom  from  Civil  Service  restrictions  also  enables  the  railway  to
focus  comprehensively  on  Its  work  force  costs,  above  all  attuning  them
to  the  prevailing  private  sector  labor  market.  This  may  result  In
restraining  wage  levels  for  some  categories  of  worker,  as  well  as
Increasing  wages  for  others  In  short  supply,  I.e.,  differential  pay  which
recognizes  the  differential  value  of  work  performed.  It  also  provides
flexibility  for  the  use  of  Incentive  wage  programs  which  reward
productivity  and  outstanding  performance  In  meeting  the  railway's
profitability  objectives.  These  questions  pertain  to  the  entire
organization.
Determine the  Ralilwy*s  Pricing  Policies
Drawing  on  the  discussion  of  pricing  In the  Strategic Plan, the
Management  Plan  will  reaffirm  the  pricing  principles  the  railway  will  apply
to the  varlous markets/services  that  It Is authorized to serve  on a
commercial enterprise basis.  As noted  In the SP, It could choose  to
apply fully  commercial pricing  to freight and perhaps express Intercity
passenger  service,  marginal  cost  pricing  to  other  Intercity  passenger
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rali-related  commercial  lines  of  business  that  It  undertakes.
The raliway  will  estimate  the  economic advisability  of  Increasing  the
volume  of  Its  freight  moving  under  contract  rates  and  on  what  terms.
Likewise  It  should  assess  the  extent  to  which  promotional  rates  will  be
offered  to  attract  new (or  previously  lost)  traffic  to  rail  service.  This
requires  careful  determination  of  the  approprlate  rate  level,  the  amount
of  potentially  profitable  traffic  likely  to  be  attracted,  whether
Increased  volume  at  the  low  promotional  rate  could  reasonably  be
expected  to  generate  sufficient  profit,  and  the  point  at  which  the
promotional  rate  could  safely  be  raised  (after  demonstrating  quality  of
service  to  the  shipper)  wlthout  losing  the  traffic.
For  the  railway's  "supported"  non-commercial  rail  services  the
Government  Is  responsible  for  making  the  pricing  decisions.  The  MP,
however,  should  show clearly  what  the  Government  has  decided  and  what
the  Implications  of  those  pricing  decisions  are  for  operation  of  the
railway.
Specify  Responsibilities  and Performance  Goals
The MP will  specify  the  responsibilities  of  each  department  and  the
managers  who direct  them.  Of  crucial  Importance,  however,  the  general
manager  (or  his  equivalent)  must  Impress  on  the  departments  that  In  a
commercial  enterprise  each  of  them  has  the  same  overall  objective,
namely,  to  achieve  the  target  profit,  contribution  to  net  Income, or  rate
of  return  that  was  determined  In  the  SP and  ratifled  In  the  CP.  This
goal  will  not  be  met  If  departments  seek  elther  to  operate  as  Isolated
flefdoms  or  set  their  own  p-Ivate  standards  of  performance.  That  Is  a
recipe  for  failure.  On the  contrary,  every  effort  must  be made by  the
departments  to  cooperate  actively  In  pursult  of  the  common objective.
Operating  the  trains  on  time  will  not  mean much If  the  marketing  demands
of  shippers  have  been  badly  misjudged;  likewise,  brilliant  marketing
initiatives  can  be wiped  out  by  train  operations  that  fall  to  deliver  the
quality  of  service  expected  by  the  shipper.  The  general  manager  and
each  department  head  must  devote  constant  attention  to  Insuring
productive  and  harmonious  Interdepartmental  relations,  and,  In  part,
should  be  evaluated  on  their  success  In  doing  so.
With that  In  mind,  the  MP  will  Include  goals  and  performance
measures  such  as  the  following  for  appropriate  departments  and  sub-
departments:
(1)  Revenue  targets,  based  on  assessments  of  demand,  expected
pricing  behavior,  and  costs.  The  objective  Is  not  gross
revenue  per  se,  but  revenue  which  makes a contribution  to  net
Income.  The  obvious  corollary  Is  that  traffic  carried  below
cost  should  elther  receive  a  tariff  Increase  or  be eliminated
aggressively.  These  targets  are  directly  related  to  the
railway's  objectives  for  levels  of  profitability  or  return  on
Investment  for  particular  commerclal  sectors/services.
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of  output.
(3)  Cost  reduction  targets  (or  Increased  output  per  unit  of cost).
(4)  Basic  performance  Indices,  e.g.,  percent  of  trains  on  time,
percent  of  locrotives  avallable  for  service,  percent  loaded
utilization  of  wagons,  meeting  current  maintenance  of  way  (MOW)
schedules  and  reducing  deferred  MOW, percent  of  revenue
collected (where passenger  fare fraud Is an Issue),  and ef-
ficiency  measures for  Government-supported  services  provided
under contract. Because of the railway's  newness In  operating
like  a commercial company, these  targets should be open  to
continual review and revislon In  the light  of experience,  but
appropriate performance Indicators  are a critical  element of
successful management.
(6)  Other  performance  commitments,  such  as  completion  of
scheduled  Investment  programs  within budget  and  on  time,
attaining various productivity  targets,  meeting staff reduc-
tion,  recruitment or training  objectives,  motivating the work
force, achieving greater  value In the utilization  of railway
assets  (leasing  station space, developing real estate, etc.),
enlisting  new  customers,  building  customer satisfaction,  devis-
Ing marketable  new  service  offerings, and  any  other  key
targets for which a particular  department  Is  responsible.
To  be  useful,  In a  practical  sense,  the  Indices and  other
performance  Indicators that  are  used  must  be  readily measurable,
understandable,  and reportable. They should  also be kept to a relatively
small  number, because the overriding aim of the railway Is to have all
employees busy selling  and delivering  the railway's  services, not  filling
out forms and re-creating the  very bureaucratic Inertia  which  the reform
effort is  meant  to eradicate.  If  large  number of employees are needed
Just to fill  out reports, then the wrong  Indicators  have been selected.
Plck only those critical  Indicators  which the department manager  needs
to know to do his job properly,  and which he must have available  at his
fingertips.  The  ultimate  criterion  of  course,  Is simply  to ask  whether
each department, manager, and employee  Is  doing  whatever  It takes to
deliver railway services to customers  at price and quality levels  that
will  keep the traffic  on the railway  (and  hopefully  attract new business)
at a  cost  low enough  to enable the enterprise  to earn  positive net
Income.
It  Is Important to emphasize,  also that the the performance goals
In  the MP are Internal  commitments among the raliway  Chief Executive and
senlor managers  and should generally not be part of the SP or CP.  In
some, limited  cases, It  may be desirable  for the SP or CP to take notice
of certain goals,  but only when they are essential to the validity  of
these documents.  What  Is to be avoided Is,  for example,  the situation
where  an  essentially technical Index such  as  locomotive availability
becomes  a  handle  for  political  debate  and  Intervention.
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THE  ENABLING  ACTIONS  PLAN
The "N section  of the  Contract Plan  provides a  comprehensive listing
of  the obligations which  the  Government  has  agreed  to  fulfill. The
Enabling Actions  Plan  takes  that  list and  develops  the  program  of
specific  steps which  must be taken to enable  the Government  to make good
on each of Its  promises, and enable the railway to begin operating as a
truly  commercial enterprlse as soon as possible.
Necessary  new  legislation  and  amendment  or  repeal of  existing
legislation  must  be  Identifled  and  a plan for achieving the necessary
enactments  established.  In Francophone  countries, the  "Cahlers des
Charges*  --  the document which  describes the full  Juridical  status of the
rallway  --  would be modified  appropriately.
Any new funding  authority needed by Government would be sought and
provision made for allocations  In  the national  budget.
With respect to regulations,  a  schedule  would be arranged for the
Issuance of needed new regulations,  or the cancellation,  amendment, or
waiver of old ones, as  required to meet  obligations  agreed  to by the
Government  In  the CP.  Similarly,  any necessary policy  or administrative
directives would  be  drafted  and  Issued to  the  relevant  government
departments.
The  Enabling Actions Plan would  also arrange  for  the  Impleme-
ntation  of agreed changes In  the organization  of government agencies and
the removal of the railway from the Civil  Service.  An action program
would be developed,  for example,  to carry out  Government commitments to
find new  Jobs  for  displaced rail workers,  to  retraln them,  to  pay
severance  allowances,  and  to assume  responsibility  for their unfunded
pension  liabilitles.
Prompt  formulation  of an Enabling  Actions Plan Is crucial to the
success  of  the  restructured  railway, because  the  longer  legal,
legislative,  regulatory, and  other  administrative  obstacles  delay the
efficient  commencement  of  operation  as  a  full-fledged  commercial
enterprise,  the  lesser  are  Its  chances  for  success  In  ending  the
financlal  hemorrhaging  which  affilcts  so  many  national  railway  systems.
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16.  See John Neilis,  Contract Plans and Public  Enterprise Performance,
World Bank WPS  118  (October  1988).
17.  For  Instance, the  objective  of  British Rail's non-Government
supported  services (freight,  parcels, and  Intercity  passenger) Is
jointly to  achieve  a  return  on  assets  of  2.7 per  cent  after
charging current cost depreciation but before  Interest.  British
Railway Board, 1988 Corporate  Plan,  p.  2.
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